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Appellant, Allen F. Grazer ("Grazer and/or "Appellant"), pursuant 
to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure respectfully submits 
this Brief on Appeal. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(j) as a case "transferred to the 
Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court." 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court improperly grant the Partial Summary Judgment 
of the Olsen Trust and deny the Motion of Grazer for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions by ruling that 
in attempting to redeem the property at issue herein (the "Property"), the 
Olsen Trust "need only substantially comply with the procedures of Rule 
69C(c) for their [sic] redemption attempts to succeed," and further 
ordering that Grazer execute a Certificate of Redemption upon the 
payment to him of the redemption price of $210.00 by the Olsen Trust? 
9 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case is an appeal from Judge Allphin's order granting partial 
summary judgment in favor of the Olsen Trust. The trial court's ruling is 
reviewed for correctness without according deference to its legal 
conclusions. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52. Since a 
summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, an 
appellate court is free to reappraise a trial court's legal conclusions. 
Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 751 P. 2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW 
In reviewing the rights of parties to redeem and the procedures with 
which the redeeming party must comply, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that: 
The right of redemption is a "substantive right to be exercised in 
strict accord with statutory terms." (Footnote omitted). Not only is 
the right of redemption substantive, but also we have stated that the 
procedures for redemption often confer substantive rights. 
Generally, therefore, when the procedure at issue affects the 
substantive rights of the parties, the procedure should be followed 
strictly in order not to interfere with these rights. 
Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1991). 
Grazer asserts that his substantive property title rights are affected by 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Olsen Trust 
10 
and the denial of Grazer's the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in 
which the court ruled the redemption attempt of the Olsen Trust on July 8, 
2008 was valid. This ruling prevents Grazer from obtaining a sheriffs 
deed to the Property and taking title to the Property. Grazer further 
asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the Olsen Trust to only 
"substantially comply" with the requirements of the redemption statute 
and rules governing redemption rather than requiring strict compliance 
with each requirement as listed in Rule 69C. 
Finally, the trial court held that the Olsen Trust need only pay the 
amount of paid only the amount of $210.00, the purchase price plus the 
premium provided under Rule 69C(e). However, in addition to the 
purchase price, "[I]n connection with the sale of the subject property, real 
property costs of sale in the total amount of $2,178.02 were incurred and 
have been paid to the Davis County Sheriffs Office" by Grazer. (R. 
6463). That amount was itemized in a Notice of Amounts Paid and Owed 
filed with the Salt Lake County Recorder on July 9,2008 as Entry No. 
2378599, in book 4570, at Page 1039-41 (the "Notice"), prior to the 
expiration of the redemption period on July 15, 2008 and should be 
included in the price to redeem required to be paid under Rule 69C. The 
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Notice further claimed $2,700 for the "reasonable use and occupation" of 
the Property by Defendant Gordon A. Jones and/or those under his 
direction and control (collectively "Jones") as allowed under Utah R. Civ. 
P.y Rule 69C(i). (R. 6463). 
STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
The process by which a property may be redeemed by is governed 
by Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-906 and set forth in Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 69C. 
78B-6-906. Right of redemption — Sales by parcels — Of land and 
water stock. 
(1) Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and 
liens are subject to redemption as in case of sales under executions 
generally. 
(2) In all cases where the judgment directs the sale of land, together 
with shares of corporate stock evidencing title to a water right used, 
intended to be used, or suitable for use, on the land, the court shall 
equitably apportion the water stock to the land. If the court divides the land 
into individual parcels for sale, the water stock may also be divided and 
applied to each parcel. The land and water stock in each parcel shall be 
sold together, and for the purpose of the sale shall be regarded as real estate 
and subject to redemption as previously specified. 
(3) In all sales of real estate under foreclosure the court may determine 
the parcels and the order in which the parcels of property shall be sold. 
Rule 69C. Redemption of real property after sale. 
(a) Right of redemption. Real property may be redeemed unless the estate 
is less than leasehold of a two-years1 unexpired term, in which case the 
sale is absolute. 
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(b) Who may redeem. Real property subject to redemption may be 
redeemed by the defendant or by a creditor having a lien on the property 
junior to that on which the property was sold or by their successors in 
interest. If the defendant redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and 
the defendant is restored to the defendant's estate. If the property is 
redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption 
may redeem. 
(c) How made. To redeem, the redemptioner shall pay the amount 
required to the purchaser and shall serve on the purchaser: 
(c)(1) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the 
redemptioner claims the right to redeem; 
(c)(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged if necessary to establish the 
claim; and 
(c)(3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien. 
(d) Time for redemption. The property may be redeemed within 180 days 
after the sale. 
(e) Redemption price. The price to redeem is the sale price plus six 
percent. The price for a subsequent redemption is the redemption price 
plus three percent. If the purchaser or redemptioner files with the county 
recorder notice of the amounts paid for taxes, assessments, insurance, 
maintenance, repair or any lien other than the lien on which the 
redemption was based, the price to redeem includes such amounts plus six 
percent for an initial redemption or three percent for a subsequent 
redemption. Failure to file notice of the amounts with the county recorder 
waives the right to claim such amounts. 
(f) Dispute regarding price. If there is a dispute about the redemption 
price, the redemptioner shall within 20 days of the redemption pay into 
court the amount necessary for redemption less the amount in dispute and 
file and serve upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the items to 
which the redemptioner objects and the grounds for the objection. The 
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petition is deemed denied. The court may permit discovery. The court 
shall conduct an evidentiary hearing and enter an order determining the 
redemption price. The redemptioner shall pay to the clerk any additional 
amount within seven days after the court's order. 
(g) Certificate of redemption. The purchaser shall promptly execute and 
deliver to the redemptioner, or the redemptioner to a subsequent 
redemptioner, a certificate of redemption containing: 
(g)(1) a detailed description of the real property; 
(g)(2) the price paid; 
(g)(3) a statement that all right, title, interest of the purchaser in the 
property is conveyed to the redemptioner; and 
(g)(4) if known, whether the sale is subject to redemption. 
The redemptioner or subsequent redemptioner shall file a duplicate of the 
certificate with the county recorder. 
(h) Conveyance. The purchaser or last redemptioner is entitled to 
conveyance upon the expiration of the time permitted for redemption. 
(i) Rents and profits, request for accounting, extension of time for 
redemption. 
(i)(l) Subject to a superior claim, the purchaser is entitled to the rents of 
the property or the value of the use and occupation of the property from 
the time of sale until redemption. Subject to a superior claim, a 
redemptioner is entitled to the rents of the property or the value of the use 
and occupation of the property from the time of redemption until a 
subsequent redemption. Rents and profits are a credit upon the redemption 
price. 
(i)(2) Upon written request served on the purchaser before the time for 
redemption expires, the purchaser shall prepare and serve on the requester 
a written and verified account of rents and profits. The period for 
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redemption is extended to five days after the accounting is served. If the 
purchaser fails to serve the accounting within 30 days after the request, 
the redemptioner may, within 60 days after the request, bring an action to 
compel an accounting. The period for redemption is extended to 15 days 
after the order of the court. 
(j) Remedies. 
(j)(l) For waste. A purchaser or redemptioner may file a motion 
requesting the court to restrain the commission of waste on the property. 
After the estate has become absolute, the purchaser or redemptioner may 
file an action to recover damages for waste. 
(j)(2) Failure to obtain property. 
(j)(2)(A) A purchaser or redemptioner who fails to obtain the property or 
who is evicted from the property because the judgment against the 
defendant is reversed or discharged may file a motion for judgment 
against the plaintiff for the purchase price plus amounts paid for taxes, 
assessments, insurance, maintenance and repair plus interest. 
(j)(2)(B) A purchaser or redemptioner who fails to obtain the property or 
who is evicted from the property because of an irregularity in the sale or 
because the property is exempt may file a motion for judgment against the 
plaintiff or the defendant for the purchase price plus amounts paid for 
taxes, assessments, insurance, maintenance and repair plus interest. If the 
court enters judgment against the plaintiff, the court shall revive the 
plaintiff s judgment against defendant for the amount of the judgment 
against plaintiff. 
(j)(2)(C) Interest on a judgment in favor of a purchaser or redemptioner is 
governed by Utah Code Section 15-1-4. Interest on a revived judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff against the defendant is at the rate of the original 
judgment. The effective date of a revived judgment in favor of plaintiff 
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against defendant is the date of the original judgment except as to an 
intervening purchaser in good faith. 
(k) Contribution and reimbursement. A defendant may claim contribution 
or reimbursement from other defendants by filing a motion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of the Case 
Grazer asserts that the Order of the trial court holding that Ludvig 
D. Olsen and Jackie M. Olsen, Trustees of the Ludvig D. Olsen and Jackie 
M. Olsen Trust (the "Olsen Trust") "need only substantially comply with 
the procedures of Rule 69C(c) for their [sic] redemption attempts to 
succeed" was error and that the redemption attempts of the Olsen Trust 
were invalid. In light of that error, the ruling should be reversed,, and this 
matter should be remanded with instructions to have a sheriffs deed 
issued to Grazer. 
IL Course of Proceedings 
a. On January 17, 2007, the property at issue herein and which 
the Olson Trust attempted to redeem (the "Property") was sold at sheriffs 
sale pursuant to a Writ of Execution issued November 8,2007. (Record 
on Appeal ("R.") 6140 -46). 
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b. Appellant/Grazer was the successful bidder for $ 191.00. (R. 
6440). 
c. Grazer paid an additional amount of $2,178.02 in costs of 
sale allowed under Rule 69C. (R. 6463). 
d. On or about July 3,2008 Gordon A. Jones, individually, in 
his capacity as sole proprietor of Gordon Jones Construction and in his 
capacity as a member of Gordon Jones Construction, L.C. and Linda G. 
Jones, Individually and in her capacity as a member of Gordon Jones 
Construction, L.C. assigned their right to redeem the Property to the Olsen 
Trust pursuant to an Assignment of Redemption Rights filed with the 
Court on July 11, 2008 (the "Assignment"). (R. 6269 - 6273). 
e. On or about July 7,2008, Renae C. Barney as personal 
representative of the estate of Richard H. Barney, individually and in his 
capacity as a member of Gordon Jones Construction, L.C. assigned the 
rights of the Estate of Richard H. Barney to redeem the Property to the 
Olsen Trust pursuant to the terms of the Assignment (Id.). 
f. On July 8, 2008, the Olson Trust tendered the amount of 
$210.00 as the redemption price. (R. 6837). 
g. The tender was rejected on July 8, 2008 by letter from 
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counsel for Grazer on the grounds that counsel was not authorized to 
accept service on Grazer's behalf, that the check was made payable to 
counsel rather than Grazer. Counsel indicated that Grazer lived in 
Colorado and that he would attempt to contact Grazer regarding the 
redemption attempt by the Olsen Trust and that he would reserve 
objections to the Olsen Trust's tender until the documents and check were 
properly served. (R. 6440-41). 
h. On July 8, 2008, prior to the expiration of the redemption 
period, Grazer recorded the Notice showing amounts he claimed as paid 
and owed as required under Rule 69C (the "Notice"). (R. 6463). 
i. Counsel for the Olson Trust "became aware of the Notice on 
or about July 15, 2008," prior to the expiration of the redemption period. 
(R.6303). 
j . On July 14, the Olsen Trust was notified by counsel for 
Grazer that "you have failed to pay the amounts for liens asserted on 
behalf of Mr. Grazer pursuant to Rule 69C(e)." (R. 6431). 
k. The redemption period expired on July 15, 2008. Utah R. Civ 
P., Rule 69C(d). 
1. On July 16, 2008, the Olson Trust filed a Request for 
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Accounting of Rents and Profits ("Request") asking for a written and 
verified account of rents and profits with respect to the Property during 
the redemption period. (R. 6274-77). 
m. On July 16, 2008, counsel for Grazer filed an Objection and 
Response to Request for Accounting of Rents and Profits ("Objection") 
on the grounds that the Request was untimely, not properly served and an 
attempt to improperly extend the redemption period. (R. 6278-82). 
n. On August 15,2008, one month after the expiration of the 
redemption period, the Olsen Trust filed a Petition for Establishment of 
Redemption Price. (R. 6302-06) 
o. In connection with the Petition, the Olsen Trust tendered to 
the Court a check in the amount of $2,465.00, which it asserted, at that 
time, to be the correct redemption amount for the Property. (R. 6304). 
p. Grazer filed a Motion to Strike the Petition for Establishment 
of Redemption Price on the grounds that the Petition had not been filed 
within the time limits of Rule 69C (within 20 days after the redemption), 
and was, therefore, untimely and invalid. (R.6316-19). 
q. On December 12, 2008, the Court issued a ruling granting 
Grazer's Motion to Strike the Petition for Establishment of Redemption 
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Price on the grounds that the Petition was untimely. The Court noted that 
the ruling did not preclude the Olson Trust from later moving that 
redemption had occurred on its prior attempts of July 8 and July 10,2008. 
(R. 6438-53, 6451-52). 
r. On December 31, 2008, Grazer filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions (R. 
6454 - 6466). 
s. The Olsen Trust responded with a Cross Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment dated February 9, 2009. (R. 6473 - 6509). 
t. On May 5, 2009, the trial court heard Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment, ruled that the Olsen Trust's redemption attempt was 
valid and that the Olsen Trust "need only substantially comply with the 
procedures of Rule 69C(c) for their [sic] redemption attempts to succeed." 
Ruling on Motions Pending at May 5, 2008 Hearing (the "Ruling"), p. 15. 
(R. 6941). 
u. On August 28,2009, the trial court, 
v. entered an Order reflecting its Ruling stating, 
On July 8, 2008, the Olsen Trust substantially complied with the 
redemption procedures of Rule 69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure when it provided Defendant's counsel, who was acting 
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on behalf of his client, with (a) a copy of the Assignment; (b) a 
check made payable to Plaintiffs counsel in the amount of $210; 
and (c) a certificate of redemption. 
[Proposed] Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on 
Redemption ("Order") f 3 (R. 6971-74,6972). 
w. The Court ordered that Grazer be paid the sum of $210 after 
the receipt of which Grazer "shall promptly execute and deliver to the 
Olsen Trust a certificate of redemption in accordance with Rule 69C(g) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." {Id.). 
x. In that same ruling, Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions was denied. 
Order. (Id.). 
y. Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal on September 18, 
2009. (R. 6975). 
HL Disposition in Court Below 
A Final Judgment from which this Appeal is taken was entered as 
an "Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on Redemption" by 
the Honorable Michael G. Allphin dated August 28, 2009 (the "Order"). 
The Court ruled that the attempted redemption by the Olson Trust on July 
8, 2008, substantially complied with the procedures of Rule 69C(c) and 
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was a valid redemption by the Olson Trust. The Court further ordered 
that the $210.00 amount originally tendered by the Olson Trust was the 
proper redemption price to be paid to Grazer. The Order was certified by 
the Court as Final as to all claims involving the attempted redemption by 
The Olsen Trust The Property had been sold at sheriffs sale on January 
17,2008 (the "Sheriffs Sale"). Grazer's Notice of Appeal was filed with 
the Clerk of the Second District Court of Davis County, Farmington 
District, State of Utah on September 16,2009. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Pursuant to a writ of execution dated November 8, 2007, the 
Davis County Sheriff sold all of Gordon A. Jones' ("Jones") and the 
estate of Richard H. Barney's ("Barney") interest in certain real property 
located in Davis County, Utah (the "Property"), to the highest bidder at a 
sheriffs sale on January 17, 2008. Petition [of the Olsen Trust] for 
Establishment of Redemption Price dated August 15, 2008 f 1. (R. 6302). 
2. Grazer was the highest bidder at the sheriffs sale and 
purchased the Property for $191.00. Id. f 2. {Id.). (R. 6303) 
3. On or about July 7, 2008, Jones and Barney executed an 
Assignment of Redemption Rights ("Assignment") assigning their right to 
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redeem the Property (pursuant to Rule 69C of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure) to the Olsen Trust. Id f 3. (R.6302-03). 
4. By letter dated July 8, 2008, counsel for the Olsen Trust 
delivered a copy of the Assignment and tendered a check to Lincoln W. 
Hobbs, attorney for Grazer in the underlying action ("Hobbs"), for a 
redemption price the Olsen Trust alleged to be the amount of $210.00 
(which covered the $191.00 purchase price of the property plus 6% annual 
interest accruing since the date of the sheriffs sale). The letter also 
requested that Grazer execute and return an enclosed Certificate of 
Redemption pursuant to subsection (g) of Rule 69C. Id. f 4. (R. 6303). 
See also, Exhibit "B " to Response to Motion to Strike Petition for 
Establishment of Redemption Price dated September 25, 2008. (R. 6387-
88, 6390). 
5. The July 8, 2008 letter did not include a certified copy of the 
judgment which the Olsen Trust claimed the right to redeem or an 
affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien as required 
under Rule 69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id) 
6. On the same date, July 8, 2008, the check and the documents 
submitted were returned to counsel for the Olsen Trust on the grounds that 
23 
Hobbs had not been authorized to accept service or payment on behalf of 
Grazer. The letter returning the check and the documents also indicated 
"Also, I am rejecting the tender of the check payable to me, for the 
redemption of property owned by my client. That is clearly not 
appropriate and I [Hobbs] intend to insist upon strict compliance in your 
clients' attempted transfer of the redemption rights." Exhibit "C" to 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Petition for 
Establishment of Redemption Price dated October 12, 2008. (R. 6429) 
7. The July 8, 2008 letter from counsel for Grazer further 
stated, "[I] will reserve my objections to your tender until the documents 
and check are appropriately served." (Id.). 
S. On July 9, 2008, Grazer recorded a Notice of Amounts Paid 
and Owed (the "Notice") with the Office of the Davis County Recorder in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 69C(e). The Notice was recorded 
with the Office of the Davis County Recorder as Entry No. 2378599, in 
Book 4570 at Pages 1039-41.] Notice, Exhibit "A " to Memorandum in 
1
 Rule 69C(e) provides that "Failure to file notice of the amounts with the 
county recorder waives the right to claim such amounts [for taxes, 
assessments, insurance, maintenance, repair or any other lien other than 
the lien on which the redemption was based]." Although Rule 69C does 
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Support of Defendant Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions. (R. 6463) 
9. The Notice itemized expenses Grazer claimed as purchaser in 
connection with the sale of the Property: 
1. In connection with the sale of the subject property, 
real property costs of sale in the total amount of $2,178.02 were 
incurred and have been paid to the Davis County Sheriffs Office. 
2. Upon information and belief, the property has been 
used since the date of the sale by the original judgment debtor 
Gordon A. Jones and/or those under his direction and/or control; 
the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property 
during the ensuing five and one-half months since the date of the 
sale is $2,750 calculated at the rate of $500.00 per month for five 
and one-half months. 
Notice. {Id.). 
10. On July 10,2008, the Olsen Trust attempted to redeem the 
property a second time. The Olsen Trust delivered to Grazer's counsel a 
not specify a time deadline during which the notice for such amounts must 
be filed, reading the Rule, as a whole, would indicate that the purchaser 
has the same 180 days to file such notice as the redemptioner has to 
redeem the property. Cf Sentry Investigations, Inc., v. Davis, 841 P.2d 
732 (Utah 1992)(Terms of a statute should not be interpreted in a 
piecemeal fashion, but as a whole. "[A] fundamental principle of statutory 
construction is that a statute should be construed as a whole, and its terms 
should be construed to be harmonious with each other and the overall 
objective of the statute." (Citation omitted). 
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copy of the Assignment, a check payable to Grazer in the amount of $210, 
and a Certificate of Redemption for execution. (R. 6441), 
11. In making the July 10, 2008 redemption attempt, the Olsen 
Trust, again, did not serve a certified copy of the Judgment or an affidavit 
showing the amount due on the judgment or lien as required under Rule 
69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See id). 
12. By letter dated July 14, 2008, Grazer indicated that he would 
not execute the Certificate of Redemption and filed a complaint against 
Jones, Barney, and the Olsen Trust alleging, among other things, that the 
Assignment was a fraudulent transfer in violation of the Utah Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act. Petition [of the Olsen Trust] for Establishment 
of Redemption Price dated August 15, 2008 f 5. (R. 6303) 
13. On or about July 15, 2008, counsel for Jones and Olsen 
became aware that Grazer had recorded the Notice. Id. f 6. (R. 6303) 
14. On July 15, 2008, the 180 day redemption period allowed 
under Rule 69C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expired. Utah R. 
Civ. P., Rule 69C(d). 
The year 2008 was a leap year, adding a day to be taken into 
consideration in the 180 day calculation. 
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15. On or about July 16, 2008, the Olson Trust filed a Request 
for Accounting of Rents and Profits ("Request") asking Grazer for a 
written and verified account of rents and profits with respect to the 
Property during the redemption period. (R. 274-77). 
16. On July 16, 2008, counsel for Grazer filed an Objection and 
Response to Request for Accounting of Rents and Profits ("Objection") 
on the grounds that the Request was untimely, not properly served and an 
attempt to improperly extend the redemption period. Objection and 
Response to Request for Accounting of Rents and Profits. (R. 6278-82). 
17. The Objection further indicated that there had been no rents 
or profits received from the Property since the date of the sheriffs sale. 
(R. 6280). 
18. On August 15, 2008, one month after the expiration of the 
redemption period, the Olsen Trust filed a Petition for Establishment of 
Redemption Price. In connection with the Petition, the Olsen Trust 
tendered to the Court a check in the amount of $2,465.00, which it 
asserted, at that time, to be the correct redemption amount for the 
Property. (R. 6302-06). 
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19. On May 5,2009, the trial court heard cross motions for 
summary judgment and ruled that the Olsen Trust's redemption attempt 
was valid and that the Olsen Trust "need only substantially comply with 
the procedures of Rule 69C(c) for their [sic] redemption attempts to 
succeed," See Ruling on Motions Pending at May 5, 2008 Hearing (the 
"Ruling") p. 15. (R. 6941) 
20. On August 28, 2009, the trial court entered an order stating 
On July 8, 2008, the Olsen Trust substantially complied with 
the redemption procedures of Rule 69C(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure when it provided Defendant's counsel, who was 
acting on behalf of his client, with (a) a copy of the Assignment; (b) 
a check made payable to Plaintiffs counsel in the amount of $210; 
and (c) a certificate of redemption. 
{Proposed] Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on 
Redemption ("Order") f 3. (R. 6972). 
21 • The Court ordered that Grazer be paid the sum of $210 after 
the receipt of which Grazer "shall promptly execute and deliver to the 
Olsen Trust a certificate of redemption in accordance with Rule 69C(g) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." {Id.). 
22, In that same ruling, Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions was denied. 
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Order, f 1. (Id). 
23, Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal on September 18, 
2009. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The issue on appeal is whether the July 8,2008 attempted 
redemption by the Olsen Trust was valid as the Trial Court ruled. The 
actions taken by the Olsen Trust subsequent to July 8,2008, however, are 
illustrative of the fact that the Olsen Trust, in each of its attempts to 
redeem the property, did not timely comply with all of the necessary 
actions or provide all of the necessary documents required under Rule 
69C. The July 8, 2008 redemption, accordingly, was invalid. The 
attempted redemption of the Property was deficient in the following 
particulars: 
1. The initial amount of $210.00 tendered by the Olson Trust on 
July 8, 2008, was not the entire amount paid or expended by Grazer nor 
did it include amounts for the "reasonable use and occupation55 of the 
Property by Jones and was properly rejected by Grazer. 
2. The tender on July 8,2008 did not include a certified copy of 
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the judgment or an affidavit of the amounts due under the judgment. 
3. The period for redemption expired on July 15, 2008. Despite 
having previously been informed by letter dated July 8, 2008 by counsel 
for Grazer that strict compliance with the redemption requirements would 
be insisted upon, the Olson Trust failed to take further action towards 
redemption of the Property prior to the expiration of the redemption 
period. It filed its "Request for Accounting and Profits" on July 16, 2008, 
one day after the expiration of the redemption period. 
4, The next action of the Olson Trust was not taken until 
August 15, 2008, one month after the expiration of the redemption period 
when it filed a "Petition for Establishment of Redemption Price." At that 
time the Olson Trust finally tendered the sum of $2,465.00 to the Court, 
the amount it calculated to be the amount required to redeem the Property 
under Rule 69C. The action of filing the Petition and tendering an amount 
to the Court should have been taken prior to the expiration of the 
redemption period pursuant to Rule 69C(f) which governs a dispute over 
the redemption price. "If there is a dispute about the redemption price, the 
redemptioner shall within 20 days of the redemption pay into court the 
amount necessary for redemption less the amount in dispute and file and 
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serve upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the items to which the 
redemptioner objects and the grounds for the objection." (Emphasis 
added). Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 69C(f). 
ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, if substantive rights are affected in a redemption 
of property, strict compliance with the redemption requirements is 
required. Huston v Lewis, 818P.2d531 (Utah 1991). Receiving the 
correct redemption price or a title to property through the issuance of a 
sheriffs deed are substantive rights. Id In Huston, Stateline Properties, 
Inc. ("Stateline") had purchased property at a foreclosure sale. 
Appellants, Lewis, notified Stateline to cease demolition on the property 
shortly after Stateline's purchase of the property and notified Stateline 4 
days prior to the expiration of the redemption period of their intent to 
redeem the property. On the date on which the redemption period would 
otherwise end, Lewis filed an ex parte motion to enlarge the period for 
redemption which was granted and a date was set for hearing on the 
amount to be paid for the redemption to be accomplished where the Court 
established a date by which funds were to be deposited with the Court. 
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Lewis was unable to the funds and the trial court ruled that the redemption 
rights had irrevocably lapsed. 
The Supreme Court affirmed stating, "[I]t is clear that the right of a 
purchaser at a sheriffs sale either to receive the proper redemption 
amount in accordance with rule 60(f) or to have the title perfected at the 
end of the six-month period is a substantive right. Accordingly, strict 
compliance with the six-month redemption period is normally required." 
Id. at 535. The Court relied on a prior case, Mollerup v. Storage Systems 
Internat% 569 P.2d 1122, 1124 (Utah 1977) in which the Court held 
"redemption under rule 69(f)(3) requires strict compliance except where a 
court sitting in equity decides that the circumstances warrant an extension 
of the redemption period." 
The Huston Court stated that Mollerup made it clear the 
[M]ere allegation of a dispute is generally not sufficient to justify 
an extension of the redemption period. 'To determine otherwise 
would allow others similarly situated to simply appear ex parte, 
assert a dispute... or some other self serving matter and the effect 
would be to abridge the rights of a purchaser at sale " 
Huston at 536. 
3
 The six month time period in Rule 69(f), Utah R. Civ. P., was changed 
to 180 days in the present rule, Rule 69C(d), Ut. R. Civ. P. 
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The Huston Court also rejected a setoff claim of an amount by 
which waste had occurred on the subject property. The court stated, "By 
waiting until the last moment to raise their claim, the Lewises insured that 
if the court accepted their argument, Stateline would be prejudiced. 
Under Lewises' theory, Stateline would have to accept the Lewises' 
determination of the amount of the waste or the redemption period would 
have to be enlarged in order for the court to make the determination." Id. 
at 537. The Court further observed that former Rule 69(f)(3) allowed a 
party to raise a dispute near the end of the redemption period "by paying 
'the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the 
court...' and filing 'with the court a petition setting forth the item or items 
demanded to which he objects, together with the grounds for 
objection...."' Id. See also, Springer v. Springer, 853 P.2d 888, (Utah 
1993) (Redemption under rule 69(f)(3) requires strict compliance.4 
Husband did not timely tender tax reimbursement, amount tendered did 
not include interest, petition to object to amounts claimed was not filed 
until two and one-half months after the redemption period expired). 
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In this case, as in Huston and Springer, the Olsen Trust failed to 
strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 69C which requires the 
service on the purchaser of (1) a certified copy of the judgment which the 
redemptioner claims the right to redeem {Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(c)(l)); (2) 
an assignment of the redemption rights, if appropriate (Utah R. Civ. P. 
69C(c)(2)); and (3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment 
(Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(c)(3)). The Olsen Trust mailed a letter to the 
counsel who had acted for the purchaser in the underlying case, not the 
purchaser himself. Of the three documents required by the Rule, the letter 
contained only the assignment. Even when the documents were returned 
by counsel for the purchaser on the grounds that the purchaser needed to 
be served and stating clearly that strict compliance would be required, the 
subsequent service, by letter dated July 10,2008, again contained only the 
assignment, not a certified copy of the judgment nor an affidavit showing 
the amount due on the judgment. (See R. 6441). Providing only 1 out of 3 
required documents is not "substantial" compliance. In ruling that the 
provision of the Assignment was "substantial compliance" with Rule 69C, 
4
 Rule 69C(c)-(e) contain substantially the same provisions as former Rule 
69(f)(2) and (3) which are cited and discussed infra. 
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subparagraphs 69C(c)(l) and (c)(3) were rendered ineffective and of no 
purpose. This is contrary to well established rules of statutory 
construction in the State of Utah. 
"It is a cardinal rule of construction that significance and effect 
shall, if possible, be accorded to every section, clause, word or part 
of the act." [Citation omitted]. 
The several provisions of the statute should be construed together 
in the light of the general purpose and object of the act and so as to 
give effect to the main intent and purpose of the legislature as 
therein expressed. [Citation omitted]. 
An interpretation which defeats any of the manifest purposes of the 
statute cannot be accepted. [Citation omitted]. 
Dunn v. Bryan, 11 Utah 604; 299 P. 253 (1931); Cf. South Ridge 
Homeowners9Association v. Brown, 2010 UT App. 23 (February 4, 
2010)(When interpreting the plain language [of a document] the court 
looks for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering 
any provision meaningless. A court is to consider each provision in 
relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and 
ignoring none). 
Further, even if the lack of two out of three of the documents 
required under Rule 69C(c) could be deemed to be "substantial 
compliance," the July 10, 2008 letter tendered only $210.00, the amount 
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of the purchase price plus 6% interest since the date of the sheriffs sale. 
It did not contain the amounts claimed by Grazer under Grazer's July 9, 
2009 Notice for additional amounts. The Olsen Trust admits it became 
aware that additional amounts were demanded on July 15, 2008; however, 
no effort was made to pay those amounts into court as required under the 
rule. "If there is a dispute about the redemption price, the redemptioner 
shall within 20 days of the redemption pay into court the amount 
necessary for redemption less the amount in dispute and file and serve 
upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the items to which the 
redemptioner objects and the grounds for the objection. (Emphasis 
added.)" Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 69C(f). 
Instead, the Olsen Trust's Petition to Establish Redemption Price 
was not filed until August 19, 2008, forty-two (42) days after the first 
rejected redemption attempt, thirty-five (35) days after the Olsen Trust 
admits it became aware of the amounts claimed to be due under Grazer's 
Notice and thirty-five (35) days after the expiration of the 180 day 
redemption period. It was not until August 19, 2008 that the Olsen Trust 
paid into the Court "the amount necessary for redemption less the amount 
in dispute." At that time, in pleadings filed with the Court, the Olsen 
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Trust acknowledged that the $210.00 had been inadequate. 
Since 1991, Utah case law has emphasized that substantive rights of 
a purchaser in the redemption process require strict compliance with the 
rules and that a sheriffs sale should be set aside only in exceptional 
circumstances. See, Huston, Springer, supra. This standard was 
approved in a recent State of Utah Court of Appeals case, Pyper v. Bond, 
2009 UT App 331; 643 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, certgranted,225 P.3d 880 
(Utah 2010). In Pyper, however, the court found that exceptional 
circumstances existed in that case.5 The sheriffs sale was set aside based 
upon the failure of plaintiff s former counsel to return telephone calls 
regarding the amount necessary to redeem property and the inadequacy of 
the price bid at the sheriffs sale. Although the time to redeem the 
property at issue was extended, given the exceptional facts of the 
particular case, the Court also noted: 
Despite our conclusion, we are not unsympathetic to Respondents5 
5
 The Pyper Court also relied on the cases of Young v. Schroeder, 37, P. 
252 (Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, 1894) and Pender v. Dowse, 
265 P.2d 644 (Utah 1954). However both of the cases involved 
circumstances the purchaser impeded the redemption process in ways the 
Court determined to be unfair. In Young, there were serious irregularities 
in the sale for which the parties who claimed title were responsible. In 
Pender, the debtor was deliberately misled by the purchaser. 
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argument that Utah law provides many other safeguards to protect 
judgment debtors and that because of such safeguards, courts 
should be reluctant to extend redemption periods. In particular, 
rule 69C(f) prevents creditors from obstructing the redemption 
process by refusing to participate therein. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
69C(f) (addressing disputes over redemption price); Granada, Inc. 
v. Tanner, 712 P.2d 254, 256 (Utah 1985) ("The intent of [former] 
Rule 69(f)(3) is to allow a redemptioner to pay the funds into court 
so that the holder of the certificate of sale cannot clog the equity of 
redemption by refusing to cooperate in the redemption process."). 
In light of rule 69C(f), we decline to recognize any duty on the part 
of a sheriffs sale purchaser to affirmatively cooperate with an 
attempted redemption. Here, however, [Appellant's] words and 
actions represented, at least implicitly, that they were going to 
participate in the redemption process. It is their failure to act in 
accordance with this representation that justifies the district court's 
finding of unfairness warranting relief. 
(Emphasis added). Id. at 15. 
The Pyper case also brought a vigorous dissent which concluded 
that the case set an unwise precedent. The dissent observed that the two 
cases relied on by the majority 
[I]nvolve some kind of affirmative actions or representations 
directly aimed at impeding redemption. "[A] purchaser at a 
sheriffs sale is under no obligation to communicate with the 
judgment debtor at all—a point that the majority apparently 
concedes, (citation omitted). 
Id. at 18. 
The dissent, further, marked conduct similar to the actions or lack 
of action taken by the Olsen Trust in this case: 
38 
Pyper was both aware that there was some deadline for redeeming 
the property and was, apparently, represented by different legal 
counsel Pyper could have easily obtained the necessary 
redemption information from the district court and could have paid 
the court in order to exercise his right of redemption, all without 
any assistance from Bond and Dorius. Indeed, he eventually, 
although belatedly, did just that. 
(Emphasis added,). Id. at 20. It is also important to note that the Utah 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Pyper. 
Similarly, here, the Olsen Trust could have paid the undisputed 
amount into Court as provided under the Rule prior to the expiration of 
the redemption period. There were no representations by Grazer or 
Grazer's counsel as to lead the Olsen Trust that anything less than strict 
compliance with the redemption procedures would be accepted. In fact, 
counsel for Grazer specifically informed counsel for the Olsen Trust, prior 
to the expiration of the 180 day period, that he "intended to insist upon 
strict compliance...." See Exhibit "C" to Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Strike Petition for Establishment of Redemption Price dated 
October 12, 2008. (R. 6429). The Olsen Trust chose not to follow the 
procedures set forth in the Rule 69C and did not pay the disputed amounts 
necessary to redeem into Court as required when it was apparent that there 
would be a dispute. Only belatedly was compliance with the provisions 
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of the Rule attempted. 
Finally, both the trial court and the Olsen Trust relied on the cases 
of United States v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976) and Tech-Fluid 
Svs., Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
for the proposition that substantial compliance will satisfy the 
requirements of the redemption procedure outlined in Rule 69C. That 
reliance is misplaced. The Rule governing redemption requirements in 
effect at the time Loosley was decided was Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 69(f). 
Subparagraphs (f)(2) and (3) of Rule 69(f) provided: 
(2) Redemption -How Made. At the time of redemption the 
person seeking the same may make payment of the amount required 
to the person from whom the property is being redeemed, or for 
him to the officer who made the sale or his successor in office. At 
the same time the redemptioner must produce to the officer or 
person from whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his notice to 
the officer: (1) a certified copy of the docket of the judgment under 
which he claims the right to redeem, or, if he redeems upon a 
mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record thereof 
certified by the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly acknowledged 
or proved where the same is necessary to establish his claim; (3) 
an affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount then 
actually due on the lien. 
(3) Time for Redemption, Amount to be Paid. The property may 
be redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on 
paying the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in 
addition, together with the amount of any assessment or taxes and 
any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, 
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upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the property which the 
purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase, with interest 
on such amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor having a 
lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption, other than the 
judgment under which said purchase was made, the amount of such 
lien, with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum 
demanded for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person 
seeking redemption may pay the amount necessary for redemption, 
less the amount in dispute, to the court out of which execution or 
order authorizing the sale was issued, and at the same time file with 
the court a petition setting forth the item or items demanded to 
which he objects, together with his grounds of objection; and 
thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for hearing of 
such objections. A copy of the petition and order fixing time for 
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than two days 
before the day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the 
court shall enter an order determining the amount required for 
redemption. In the event an additional amount to that theretofore 
paid to the clerk is required the person seeking redemption shall 
forthwith execute and deliver a proper certificate or redemption 
upon being paid the amount required by the court for redemption. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 69(f)(2) and (3) (1975). See also, SUMMARY OF 
UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW, VOLUME I, §9.236 (J. Reuben Clark 
LawSch., 1978.) 
The Loosely Court indicated that the redemptioner had substantially 
complied with Rule 69(f)(2) and did not deal with the requirements of rule 
69(f)(3). Further, in requiring the purchasers at the sheriffs sale to 
release the mortgage upon receipt of the tendered payment for 
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redemption, the Court relied on the facts that the correct redemption 
amount had been tendered prior to the expiration of the redemption 
period: 
They [the purchasers] did not then, and do not now, question that 
the debtor redemptioner's rights had, in fact, been assigned to the 
defendant; nor that the defendant made the tender of the correct 
amount due for redemption one day before the redemption period 
expired. When so advised they did not then indicate any ground 
whatsoever for rejecting the tender. If they had done so, defendants 
would have had 24 hours to remedy any technical deficiency. 
Loos ley at 508. 
The case of Tech-Fluid Svcs. was also decided under former 
Rule 69(f), with language similar to that in effect at the time of Loosely. 
The Tech-Fluid decision, however, made a distinction between 
substantive rights under subparagraph f(3) of Rule 69 which required 
strict compliance and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule 69 under which 
"substantial compliance is the proper test." Id at 1334. As in Loosely, 
the Court found that the redemptioner had "tendered the correct amount 
within the redemption period" and further found that "Tech-Fluid did not 
challenge the validity of the tender until several days after the tender and 
after the redemption period had run." (Emphasis added). Id. 
In this case, unlike in Loosely or Tech-Fluid, from outset, 
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commending with the time of the initial tender, counsel for Grazer 
indicated that strict compliance would be required, that the redemption 
price had not been appropriately served, that the redemption amount was 
not correct. Grounds were given for rejection of the tender - the amount 
tendered was not the correct redemption amount Grazer had the 
substantive right to receive. Failing to receive the correct redemption 
amounts due, * Grazer's substantive right to receive title to the 
Property by sheriffs deed was not just affected; it was thwarted. 
CONCLUSION 
Grazer had a substantive right to either timely receive the property 
redemption amount in accordance with the procedure set forth in Rule 
69C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or to have the his title perfected 
through the issuance of a sheriffs deed at the end of the redemption 
period when that period expired on July 15, 2008. The Olsen Trust did 
not tender the correct redemption amount, the correct documentation to 
the correct party when it made its first attempted redemption on July 8, 
2008. Despite its "awareness" on July 9, 2008 that Grazer claimed 
additional amounts under the Notice properly recorded with the Davis 
County Recorder, the Olsen Trust still failed to tender the amounts or the 
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documents required under the Rule. Compliance with the provisions of 
the Rule was not made until 35 days after the expiration of the redemption 
period, 45 days after the initial attempted redemption. The redemption 
was not timely, the redemption attempts were invalid and strict 
compliance with the requirements of Rule 69C was not met. The trial 
court erred in granting the Olsen Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
in ruling that the Olsen Trust need only "substantially comply" with the 
requirements of Rule 69C and ordering Grazer to execute a Certificate of 
Redemption upon the payment of $210.00. Grazer's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions 
should have been granted. Grazer asks this Court to reverse the Order of 
the trial court and remand the case to the trial court with directions to 
enter partial summary judgment in favor of Grazer with regard to the 
redemption and to require a sheriffs deed to issue vesting title to the 
Property in Grazer in accordance with his substantive rights. 
[Date and signature on next page] 
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DATED thi day o f April, 2010. 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
L I M N W O T 
MARGARET H. OLSON 
JULIELADLE 
KATHYA.F. DAVIS 
Attorneys for Allen F. Grazer 
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SECOND 
I DISTRICT COURT 
IN II IK SK< ONI) DISTRICT COURT, 1 )A VIS COUNTY 
STATROFIITAII 
GORDON JONES an individual; and 
RICHARD BARNEY, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, RULING ON MOTIONS PENDING AT 
MAY 5,2009 HEARING 
vs. 
ALLEN F. GRAZER, an individual, Case No. 020700570 
Defendant. ° n A^phh 
ALLEN F. GRAZER, 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GORDON A. JONES; and RICHARD 
BARNEY, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
GORDANJONES, an:i.!. : 
RICHARD BARNEY an individual; 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R W DESIGN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
ROBERTS W. SPEIRS PLUMBING, INC 
Utah corporation; SCOTT SESSIONS, L.. 
individual; and NU-TREND ELECTRIC 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
VD29O47707 pages: 28 
020700570 GRAZER.ALLEN 
Third Party Defendants. 
ALLEN F. GRAZER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GORDON A. JONES and LINDA G. JONES, 
husband and wife and as Trustees, Gordon 
and Linda Jones Family Trust; CHERYL 
GUDMUNDSON, an individual; G. SCOTT 
JONES, an individual; JASON JONES, an 
individual; GS JONES CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation; J & J 
LIVESTOCK, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company; RICHARD H. BARNEY and 
RENAE CARNON BARNEY, husband and 
wife; RENAE CARNON BARNEY, Trustee 
of the Renae Carnon Barney Trust; RENAE 
CARNON BARNEY FAMILY 
PARTNERSHIP; ROCHELLE C. BARNEY; 
RICHILYN WOODIN; THE LINDA G. 
JONES FAMILY PARTNERSHIP; and 
JOHN DOES 1-20, 
Defendants. 
This matter is before the Court on: (1) Allen Grazer's Motion for Equitable Lien and 
Order of Foreclosure (Idaho Tractor); (2) Defendant Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions; (3) The Olsen Trust's Cross Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment; (4) Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against GS 
Jones Construction, Inc.; and (5) Counterclaim Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Garnishee 
Judgment Against the Shaffer Law Office or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment Setting 
Aside Fraudulent Transfers. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along 
2 
with supporting documentation The Court also conducted a hearing on u - , 
2009 il jufij" 1.1 MI :- • Arguments, being fully advised in the premises, aim •: .LW 
reasons set forth below, the Court rules as follow: 
BACKGROUND 
Xhis matter arose be" ~ Plaintiffs , . ,nes") and R ichard Barney 
(Herein, "Barney")1 and Deten*• n Grazer (herein ^(^/^"x regarding the consti uction of 
a resident ...K- Ja3ne> f-achpam aims against 
the other and a bench trial was held ti«^. *pnl 26, L W J
 UJM»I-C. 
.'iM^, (In I 'i > "i»« ii il1 its I Hidings ol hid and Conclusions of Law pursuant to the bench jial. 
The Court ruled in favor of Grazer on each of the plaint* *. , .;....,.* ,i azer's 
counterclaim. I he Court subsequently entered judgment m favor of Grazer on Fnh • lf * -
the amount of $1,886,727,87 S»n< <" (<""" »"""" , I ' i v |' , me partis ,.flvc filed numcu-us 
motions with the Court' in a coiiliiiiiiiiir dispute regarding Grazer's collection of hi*-
award. 
On October 5, 2005, and prior lo ihe certification of the judgment L.L liiial t HAJ IT M i •. fil 
a mi if n, ii II i^ l MI in lunch lotMScl, ihe Shaffer Law Office, request!; identification of 
any property,, including money, held by the Shaffer I ,a - -: MI interest in T l i e 
Shaffei I ,dv\ i Hint", through Dar-u • • Shafier, respont ie v rit asserting that it held no 
such property. However , Jones had — • <' * ice approximately 
,V>°,000 as a retainer to pay for its legal re;tn % -i *ouc< n> th.s and related 
B y written ruling datfd V1""'' I I, JOlKi, Hn t W i i certified the judgment as final. 
Subsequently, Jones filed a bankruptcy action in the "United States Bankrupt*11 y I, YHII f U >i the 
Subsequent to the filing of this action ILmk i tLnJ Hiim1'! s L&tutc is now party to this litigation. 
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District of Utah; Case No. 06-21277 JAB. On January 31, 2007, the Trustee of Jones' 
bankruptcy estate entered a settlement agreement with Grazer. Pursuant to this settlement 
agreement, the parties agreed to resolve and compromise any and all claims and disputes, which 
then existed between them. However, the settlement agreement specifically exempted Jones' 
property that was subject to Grazer's pending fraudulent transfer actions in Utah and Idaho. 
One of the fraudulent transfers that Grazer alleged pertains to $80,000 paid to GS Jones 
Construction, Inc. for work performed on a residential home owned by Mr. and Mrs. Harry 
Sayama (herein, the "Sayamas"). On March 1,2005, Jones' company, Gordon Jones 
Construction, submitted a bid proposal to the Sayamas for renovations on their home. However, 
the Sayamas issued a check for $80,000 to GS Jones Construction, Inc., a company formed by 
Jones and his son on June 2, 2005. Grazer alleges that this check was issued to GS Jones 
Construction, Inc., rather than Gordon Jones Construction in an attempt to fraudulently avoid 
Grazer's garnishing the payment. Jones counters this argument by asserting that GS Jones 
Construction, Inc. took over the Sayama project in July 2005 and performed the vast majority of 
work on the Sayama home, which entitles it to the $80,000 payment. 
Another fraudulent transfer that Grazer alleged of Jones pertains to a loan that Jones 
made to his son for the purchase of a tractor. On March 4, 2005, four (4) months prior to the 
Court entering judgment against Jones in this matter, Jones loaned his son $51,000 to purchase a 
tractor. Grazer alleges that Jones' son never repaid this loan and that it was merely one of a 
series of fraudulent transfers of property by Jones to avoid Grazer's collection on his judgment 
Jones rebuts Grazer's allegations indicating that the loan was not a fraudulent transfer and 
asserting that Grazer has presented no evidence to support his claim to the contrary. 
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Additionally, on Tai^n \ " J'Oi'* n TSUJIV, :.*.» - * of execution dated Novrmbri H 
-v-nco aiiu ilk barney's Estate's interest in certain real 
•sropert> ift..r . ^ County, Utah (herein, the "Prop, ilv I l>i llu hirhr.l lu.ltlu .\l Ihe 
Mlieiilfs sale, ilif bight: st hnUi»r was Grazer vith.it* ?•• ^ I S> ? 0* On July 7, 2008 Jonc-idad 
the Barney's Estate executed >•• < < gm:, iiie^;. >< -\:>Mgnmr:t"y 
pi uporting to assign their right to redeem the Property Jo « ndvig!) Olsen and Jack - *4 
asni'stivs'ii'Mn i i|<i\ i(» 11 i iiscii ,111-1 lacKie ivl UIM M I" ist (herein, the "Olsen Trust"). 
On July 8, 2008, and within thr i *. - >H -
• In I lldli Kuli> i i•.'!I Proccduic, the Olsen has
 tn - a redeem the Propeit M* 
delivering to Grazer's counsel: (1) a copy of the Assi^iimcti I. ' i • tuvk made payable lo 
Grazer" s counsel in the amount ol Si 10.00, purporting to cover Ihe $191 00 purchase price1 plus 
six percent (6%) annual interest <« i until" linn he njn m ir sn :n<i •• ,,::!ti iJid i.h a prop • J 
certificate ol red*, nipt I on The Olsen Trust requested that Grazer sign and a^iui e 
proposed certificate ol rvdrninliun inid h lum llie same to the Olsen Trust no later man Jul} 
2008. 
Si lbsequently , on July 8, 2008, Urazer's counsel returned the documents and check to the 
Olsen Trust thereby rejecting thru fender, By It Iter of same *Lilc Gi F H < i nuiisrl inf i I ihr 
Olsen I rust that Ms reason for rejecting the tender was -;ai -e was not authwn/ed to accept 
service of the redemption materials on tx *. ;icck was made payable 
^
 r ather than Grazer. 
On July 9, 2008, pui'^m l^ ii'lc (VK/(cj „, «u.* -. % *vil Procedure. Graze? 
had recorded a Notice of Amounts Paid and Owed with die liavib « 
5 
which Grazer claimed that he had incurred and paid $2,178.02 in conjunction with the sheriffs 
sale along with an additional $2,750.00 in costs. 
On July 10, 2008, the Olsen Trust attempted to redeem the Property for a second time. 
The Olsen Trust, after being informed that Grazer's counsel now had the authority to accept 
service of the redemption materials, delivered: (1) a copy of the Assignment; (2) a check made 
payable to Grazer in the amount of $210.00; and (3) a proposed certificate of redemption. 
By letter dated July 14, 2008, the day before the end of the 180-day redemption period, 
Grazer indicated to the Olsen Trust that he would not execute the proposed certificate of 
redemption thus rejecting the Olsen Trust's second attempted redemption. In this letter, Grazer 
asserted his belief that the Olsen Trust's Assignment was not a bona fide transfer for value and 
was thus a fraudulent transfer, that the attempted redemption failed to pay the amounts Grazer 
claimed owed in his Notice of Amounts Paid and Owed recorded July 9, 2008, and his belief that 
Jones and/or individuals under Jones' control and/or direction had used the Property since the 
sheriffs sale. The Olsen Trust's documents and check were subsequently returned. 
Following the rejection of the Olsen Trust's second attempted redemption, on August 15, 
2008, the Olsen Trust filed a Petition for Establishment of Redemption Price on the Property and 
submitted to the Court a check in the amount of $2,465.00, purporting to encompass the entire 
undisputed and correct amount of the redemption price for the Property. By written ruling dated 
December 12, 2008, the Court found the Olsen Trust had failed to strictly comply with Rule 
69C(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to the 20-day deadline for filing a petition 
to determine a disputed redemption price. However, the Court did not reach the merits of the 
Olsen Trust's attempted redemptions of July 8, 2008 and July 10,2008, but noted that the parties 
were free to raise the issue at a later date. 
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" ^sequently, the paiiies completed r f^*ne hi me instant motion 
.iic v ourt iielu a hearing on the instant motions A \iti 
1
 i^ OL\ the parties reasserted the argument 5 .*. • .u&aruing e.K .,,.;,-
ni'J.iiil motions. \\ iiit close of the hearing, tfie parties submitted the motions for decision and 
the Court took the matter ' »i-w i^^  .:ie nstant motions are ripe for 
determination 
i H VSIS 
L Allen Grazer's Motion for Equitable Lien and Order of Fori, -I i .n , • n ( I d • li 
Tractor). 
On December 20, 2007, < ii'.mi hied lii'i iimfioii Ioi rqmlable hen and order of 
foreclosure (Idaho Tractor). In his accompanying supporting memorandum, * * . 
this transaction was not a loan, but rather was a fraudulent transfer made in dn attempt to .-
collectic * : hater's judgment. In support of his •*-—,^' j ^ . .
 t Se 
k • . - niths pi ioi to the entry of ju s \\VA Jones, the fad tfiat luav„ 
son has not repard tn*» loan, and the fact that Jones . . . , ,^ vO\aiii assets 
after entry of the judgment. 
Jones filed his mcinoraiidiiHi it. oppo^'iM! In (h;\/cr s mo'ion on January 14,2008. In his 
opposing memorandum, Jones asserted that Grazer had not nn^ented a sufficient factual hi*-" • <» 
succeed on his motion Spec < ugued that the mcic fact that the loan was made m 
the same year as the judgment does not mdirate the loan was frauo 
submit i< d ihui :it iii !• IIIIK: oi liit, loan he had over $1,000,000 in assets and no need to 
fraudulently transfer his assets. Jones also ar.r ^ on over the 
11 aclur .iiici his son, as both reside in Idaho a -oan occurr», .ii .a^iiu. Jones then assert' d 
that an equitable lien ana ii i si 1 IN li i-I • \\ mill A% i • s I A •• iimdiie process 
/ 
On February 13, 2008, Grazer filed his reply memorandum in support of his motion. In 
his reply, Grazer argued that the court clearly had jurisdiction over money transferred by Jones, a 
resident of Utah, to his son. Grazer also noted that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Jones' 
son, as he made an appearance in this action when he filed an answer on February 6, 2006. 
Grazer then asserted that the fact Jones' son never repaid the loan is evidence of its fraudulent 
nature. Further, Grazer enumerated other instances of Jones' attempts to conceal his property 
from Grazer, such as Jones' attempt to hide is car at his neighbor's residence. Grazer then 
submitted that an equitable lien is appropriate under the circumstances. 
Subsequently, at the May 5, 2009 hearing, the parties submitted this matter for decision. 
First, as a preliminary matter on the issue of whether the Court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over Jones' son, the Court's file contains an answer filed by Jones' son on February 
6,2006. Accordingly, the Court finds that Jones' son has made a general appearance in this 
litigation and has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court. See Barlow v. 
Cappo, 821 P.2d 465,466-67 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[A]n appearance by the defendant for any 
purpose except to object to personal jurisdiction constitutes a general appearance. In fact, by 
asking the court for any affirmative relief, a defendant thereby submits himself or herself to that 
court's jurisdiction."). Thus, the Court has jurisdiction to rule on Grazer's motion for equitable 
lien and the Court rejects Jones' due process argument regarding the same. 
Next, an equitable lien is a remedy available to courts to avoid injustice to, or unjust 
enrichment of, a party. See Harline v. Danes, 567 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977). "Where property of 
one person can by a proceeding in equity be reached by another as security for a claim on the 
ground that otherwise the former would be unjustly enriched, an equitable lien arises." Id. at 
1121, fii. 1 {quoting Restatement of Restitution, §161). However, u[t]he mere fact that a person 
8 
benefits anothei "s not of itself sufficient to require the other to make restu • 
I . . stitution § 1, Comment c). Accordingly, in. determining whether 
.1 suitable lie1:- s <mpiopnate, the Court must weigh the I'liriimsLmres n.C (In; IUISI ,iiid da ink 
„\ Imlhcr such <i hen is necessar- tr avoid injustice 01 nm>f enrvf 
xii me instant matt -i . .\ \ .:;u and supporting 
documentation for the Court to grant his motion for an equitable lien against the Id*:1 
Vi iiotnl by Ui\\ "., Hi', nine hi. I Hi,!1! ,i pi J ciiiiiil was entered against Jones in the same year as 
) 
the loan to his son does not substantiate a fraudulent transfer "* 
Jones jllcoipls M» conceal property that Grazer's motion relies * p* *nn *me factor m ih^ 
Court's analysis, and regardless are distinguishable;1 fioin ill , Id . .,.. v occurred 
after the Court entered judgment against Jones, The loan at issue here occurred four • 4) months 
prior to the judgment The (Jul Ili.ii hmc\ m.n LHT ilii'injiud lo liulc his assets after the entry of 
judgment against him does not necessarily mean that Jones' loan made prior to the judgment 'was 
fraudulent. 
Additionally, while Grazer asserts that Jones' son has not repaid tl 
present competent evidence to support such an assertion. The only evidence that Grazer has 
presented is that the loan was undocumented and ihiil HI HIS ih'poMhmi, I'oiics sl.Ued thai lie 
considered the transaction a "father-to-son loan,,J that would W JMH' back "'whenever [his son] 
2
 The finding of a fraudulent transfer is a highly fact sensitive issue that requires the Court to weigh several factors, 
which are enumerated in Utah Code Ann. §25-6-5(2). See Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 163 P.3d 713, 722 
(Utah Ct. App. 2007) ("Importantly the existence of fraudulent intent is a factual question, which necessarily 
involves weighing the evidence presented and assessing the credibility of witnesses - tasks largely within the 
province of the fact-finder."); see also Utah Code Ann. §25-6-5(2). 
4
 Depo. Gordon A. Jones, 1.57:13-16, 23, 158:5-7, 10-12 (June 8, 2006) 
9 
can get it paid off." Finally, Grazer's conclusory allegations that the money loaned to Jones' son 
is subject to his garnishment are insufficient to establish the same. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Grazer has failed to present sufficient evidence as to the 
nature and circumstances of the loan to move the equities of the Court to grant an equitable lien 
against the Idaho tractor. The Court must therefore DENY Grazer's motion for equitable lien and 
order of foreclosure (Idaho Tractor). 
II. Defendant Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Invalidity of 
Attempted Redemptions. 
On January 9, 2009, Grazer filed his motion for partial summary judgment regarding 
invalidity of attempted redemptions. In his accompanying supporting memorandum, Grazer 
argued that the Olsen Trust's July 8, 2008 and July 10,2008 attempted redemptions must fail. 
First, Grazer asserted that the July 8, 2008 attempted redemption fails because the materials and 
payment check were submitted and made payable to his counsel, rather than himself. Grazer 
contends that his counsel did not have authority to accept the Olsen Trust's attempted 
redemption on his behalf until July 9, 2008. Next, Grazer argued that the Olsen Trust's July 10, 
2008 attempted redemption fails because the $210.00 payment check was in the wrong amount. 
Grazer noted that, pursuant to Rule 69C(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,5 a notice of 
additional costs was recorded with the Davis County Recorder's Office on July 9,2008, which 
increased the amount necessary to redeem the Property from $210.00 to at least $2,465.00. Thus, 
Grazer averred the Olsen Trust failed to properly and timely redeem the Property within the 180-
4
 Depo. Gordon A. Jones, 149:10-13 (June 8,2006). 
5
 Rule 69C(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads in relevant part, "If the purchaser or redemptioner files 
with the county recorder notice of the amounts paid for taxes, assessments, insurance, maintenance, repair or any 
lien other than the lien on which the redemption was based, the price to redeem includes such amounts plus six 
percent for an initial redemption or three percent for a subsequent redemption. Failure to file notice of the amounts 
with the country recorder waives the right to claim such amounts." Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(e). 
10 
day redemption period as set forth in Rule 69C(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and thus, 
c: the I 'li'ijif iiitis! Inn! Ih.il <\w In "M"l ilu I Jlsen I rust's attempted redemptions failed. 
]| On February 5, 2009, Barney's Estate filed a memorandum in opposition 1" i < Ira/ci "s 
Si 
•; i In its opposing memorandum, Barney's Estate argued that a material issue of fact exists 
** regarding whether Grazer will receive a windfall if fin* in' \ .s, '<M"S and Jul v 111, 2008 attempted 
t; redemptions are defeated. Barney's Estate asserts that because the Court's December 12,2008 
?! 
vi ruling did not n\n h ihr inn il «. i il Ihis argument, a material issue of fact must exist regarding 
Grazer's motion and therefore, the motion must be denied.6 
led its memorandum in opposition to Grazer's 
motion. In its opposing memorandum, the Olsen Irusl argttni dial its attrmplnl lakmptions at 
least substantially complied with Rule 69C of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure and that as a 
result, Grazer should not be allowed to «i« §>i»\« if i il in mi. s' .^signed i cdemption rights. Further, 
the Olsen Trust averred that Grazer's counsel had the authority to accept the July 8, 2008 tender 
of payment based 'ipon Ins \nvu M" iMuiynit mil .ihilily to accept documents filed in this action. 
The Olsen Trust asserted that because Grazer's counsel had authority to accept <1<H uimnf« n 
• ni.tliu'i and (ira/n Ii.nl nm n't itcorded the notice of additional costs with the Davis County 
Recorder's Office, the redemption check for $210.00 payable to Grazer's rotiose! sul'tii-Mill \ 
oHiiplinJ .villi Hit," redemption requirements of Rule 69C. 
6
 On April 24,2009, Grazer filed a motion to strike the memorandum in opposition filed by Barney's Estate. In the 
accompanying supporting memorandum, Grazer argued that the Estate lacks standing to object to Grazer's challenge 
to the attempted redemptions, as it does not seek an interest in the Property. Further, Grazer asserts that the opposing 
memorandum failed to set forth any disputed or undisputed facts, as required by Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and should be disregarded in its entirety. No responsive pleading was filed with the Court; however, as 
the Olsen Trust's opposing memorandum raises the same argument as the Estate's opposition and the Court does not 
rely upon the Estate's opposition in reaching its determination, the Court finds that Grazer's motion to strike is futile 
and DENIES the same. 
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Additionally, the Olsen Trust argued that Grazer's counsel's failure to provide notice of 
the July 9, 2008 recording of additional costs relating to the redemption should estop Grazer 
from claiming that the $210.00 payment check submitted in its July 10, 2008 redemption attempt 
was insufficient. The Olsen Trust submitted that Grazer's and his counsel's actions were made in 
bad faith and that the Court should not allow Grazer to receive an unwarranted windfall if the 
attempted redemptions fail, as the Olsen Trust noted that Grazer purchased the Property at the 
sheriffs sale for $191.00 and the Property is worth over $500,000. 
On April 9,2009, Grazer filed his reply memorandum in support of his motion. In his 
reply, Grazer asserted that the Court has already ruled that strict compliance with Rule 69C of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is required. Thus, Grazer submits that the Olsen Trust's 
attempted redemptions have no legal force or effect, as the July 8,2008 attempt was tendered to 
the wrong party and the July 10,2008 attempt did not include the full redemption amount. 
Further, Grazer noted that neither attempted redemption included a certified copy of the 
judgment/lien, or an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment/lien, as required by Rule 
69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Grazer asserted that the Olsen Trust has 
submitted no evidence supporting the allegations of impropriety directed at himself and his 
counsel. Accordingly, Grazer requested the Court find that each of the Olsen Trust's attempted 
redemptions failed to strictly comply with Rule 69C and order the sheriff to deliver to him a deed 
to the Property. 
Subsequently, at the May 5,2009 hearing, the parties submitted this matter for decision. 
As a preliminary consideration, the parties do not dispute the material facts and 
circumstances of the Olsen Trust's attempted redemptions. The issues before the Court are issues 
of law regarding the interpretation of Rule 69C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
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applying the undisputed facts to such interpretation. AccunlmH\ 'hMVul inav gianl summary 
ci judgment on Grazer's motion if appropriate. 
}j T h e p r i m a r y i s sue in G r a z e r ' s mniiMii tor pait ial s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t r e g a r d i n g inva l id i ty 
\\ 
of attempted redemptions is whether Rule 69C requires strict or substantial compliance 1 ( si net 
<r 
*' c<>inpii,iiii:</ iv "'ni'ii'sd, thin *W i ''Isen Trust's attempted redemptions must fail as neither 
!i 
# complied with the requirements of serving a certified copy ot the iiidginenMieii .unl .in ,i( ti<lu\ il 
r! 
M 1 ii 11 it« the amount due on the judgment/lien. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(c). However, if 
substantial compliance is all that is required under Rule '>*>< |r )„ linn lln: i Mv/ii I rust has at least 
substantially complied with the Rule with its July 8, 2008 attempted redemption. 
While Grazer assert that the ( oun \ * 'svaiitxi I>, !008 ruling already decided the issue 
of whether strict or substantial compliance with Rule 69C is required, the Court's mlmr n as 
IHHIIMI HI 1\ in ili iriiiiiicfiicimh ml Rule 69C(f) pertaining to the filing of a petition to establish a 
disputed redemption price. The Court's ruling did not address the ^ or 
silbstantial compliance is required under the procedures set forth in Rule 69C(c), which is at 
issue in Grazer's instant motion.8 
The Olsen Trust places its reliance that substantial compliance is required under Rule 
69C(c) on the Utah Supreme < \ turf ,:*isc ('mWt/ States i Loosley. bb I F.2d 506 (Utah 1976). In 
Loosley, the Court was asked to determine if a party's failure to deliver the appropriate 
redemption document «-f^  hlA n ip- mIemjits at redeeming certain real property. The Loosley 
Court discussed the purpose of a foreclosure proceeding being equitable iii ii.ilin In \\\\ 
7
 Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
8
 Rule 69C(c) provides that a redemptioner shall pay the amount required to the purchaser and shall serve on the 
purchaser: (1) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the right to redeem exists; (2) an assignment, if 
necessary to establish the claim; and (3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 69C(c). 
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"[Rjules and statutes dealing with redemption are regarded as remedial in 
character and should be given liberal construction and application to 
permit a property owner who can pay his debts to do so, and thus make his 
creditor whole, and save his property." 
Id. at 508. Then, applying this liberal construction, the Court held, "if a debtor, acting in good 
faith, has substantially complied with the procedural requirements of the rule ... the law will not 
aid in depriving the mortgagor of his property for mere falling short of exact compliance with 
technicalities." Id. (Emphasis added). 
The Loosley holding was further discussed in the Utah Court of Appeals' analysis in 
Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc. 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
Tech-Fluid Services, Inc., the Court discussed when strict and substantial compliance standards 
should be used in the context of redemption rights, to wit: 
"Not all redemption provisions are alike. Courts, in evaluating the 
necessity for strict compliance in these kinds of cases, focus upon the 
nature of the statutory requirements and the likelihood of prejudice. If 
failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a substantive right of one 
of the parties and possibly prejudice that party, then courts require strict 
compliance. On the other hand, if the requirements are merely procedural 
and will not prejudice one of the parties, substantial compliance is 
sufficient." 
Id. at 1333 (Emphasis added). The Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. Court then found that the time limit 
for redemption "clearly affects a substantive right of the purchaser" as "[a]ll right, title and 
interest in the property do no vest in the purchaser at a foreclosure sale until the redemption 
period has expired." Id. However, the Court based its holding on the procedural requirements of 
redemption, just as in Loosley, noting that substantial compliance was all that is required under 
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the redemption provision that discusses how redemption is made, i e the nirrenl Rule (){H '"It ),"'"' 
which is precisely the subsection of the Rule at issue in the instant matter. 
Accordingly, based upon ! 1 IN liuldmf^ ami iiimlvsib ul L>)osUiy and l\rh Fluid Services, 
Inc., the Court finds that the Olsen Trust need only substantially comply with the procedures o f 
Uuli fi'H'^t1) 1'ir Ihnr rn lnnpl i im alirn1111s to succeed. 
In the July 8, 2008 redemption attempt the Olsen Trust provided G r a z e r \ counsel <v»'h 
i l i i copy ot die Assignment; (2) a check made payable to Grazer's counsel in the amount o f 
$210.00, purporting to cover the $191.00 purchase piii v pl.is si> parent (C>V) animal interest 
accruing from the date o f the sheriffs sale; and (3) a certificate o f redemption. While the Olsen 
Trust failed to provide Graver \\ iih ;i rcmfiod i.opv of f he judgment/ l ien and an affidavit 
regarding the amount due, the Court finds that the Olsen Trust nevertheless substantially 
r o m p h n l vvilfi t)i„ pitk tuliiinl iu|ii«ieincnts oi Rule69C(c) . In so ruling, the Court finds that • 
Grazer's argument that his counsel did not have authority to accept the redemption attempl i'i 
J ul y H H it IK, is iinpersuasive and without merit. As argued by the Olsen Trust, Grazer's counsel 
was involved from the beginning of this litigation ,nu1 li.til ll r authority to accept documents 
filed therein throughout the proceedings. Further, the Olsen Trust's windfall argument adds 
support to the Court's finding. While the parties presented nc • ev idence regarding the appraised 
value of the Property, its value is clearly greater than the $191.00 paid at the sheriffs sale by 
Grazer. Accordingly, Hi*: < 'ourt nui^f ' >hN Y < ira/ei "s motion lor partial summary judgment 
regarding invalidity o f attempted redemptions. 
9
 See Tech-Fluid Services, Inc., 787 P.2d at 1334 ("Based upon the authority discussed above, and in particular 
Loosley, we affirm that substantial compliance is the proper test under Rule 69(f)(2).")-
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III. The Olsen Trust's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
The Olsen Trust's cross motion for partial summary judgment pertains to the same 
subject matter as Grazer's motion for partial summary judgment regarding invalidity of 
attempted redemptions and contains the same arguments, i.e. the Olsen Trust's July 8, 2008 and 
July 10, 2008 attempted redemptions.10 Accordingly, the Court's determination on Grazer's 
motion dictates the Court's ruling on the Olsen Trust's cross motion. Therefore, because the 
Court denies Grazer's motion due to the Olsen Trust's July 8, 2008 attempted redemption 
substantially complying with Rule 69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must 
GRANT the Olsen Trust's cross motion for partial summary judgment. 
IV. Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against GS Jones Construction, 
Inc. 
On February 17, 2009, Grazer filed his motion for partial summary judgment against GS 
Jones Construction, Inc. In the accompanying supporting memorandum, Grazer argued that GS 
Jones Construction, Inc. received an $80,000 payment for renovation work performed on the 
Sayamas' home that should have been subject to Grazer's garnishment of Gordon Jones 
Construction. Grazer asserted that Gordon Jones Construction provided the Sayamas a bid for the 
renovation work and performed the labor. Grazer submitted, however, that the Sayamas' 
payment was made to GS Jones Construction, Inc., rather than Gordon Jones Construction in a 
fraudulent attempt to avoid Grazer's garnishment of Gordon Jones Construction. 
On April 14, 2009, Jones filed his memorandum in opposition to Grazer's motion. In his 
opposing memorandum, Jones acknowledged that Gordon Jones Construction provided the bid 
10
 Again, it is worth noting that the parties do not dispute the material facts pertinent to the Olsen Trust's attempted 
redemptions. The issues before the Court are issues of law regarding the interpretation of Rule 69C of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and applying the undisputed facts to such interpretation. Accordingly, the Court may grant 
summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the Olsen Trust's cross motion. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
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for the renovation of the Sayamas' residence, but asserted that GS Jones Construct i in, liu knik 
tlic piojcu in July 2005 and performed the majority of the work on the home. Jones further 
asserted that it is uncertain how much work (ionlon I MK> " on 4tm fion pn formal it HIP 
Sayamas' home and thus, a material issue of fact exists as to what portion of the $80,000 
payment Gordon. Jones Consti uction is entitled and vv hat amount, if" any, is subject to Grazer's 
garnishment. Additionally, Jones filed a supporting affidavit of G. Scott Jones, which discussed 
.mini ,tf(ai lied 111v u"h cs fioiii subcontractors and the costs associated with the Sayama project.11 
The affidavit also asserted that Grazer was paid $18,000.0 from the Siivamas' p.iynicw in < iS 
Jones Construction, Inc. pursuant to his garnishment. 
On April 24, 2009, Grazer filed his reply \\u:m ii'miilum in suppoM ol his motion. In his 
reply, Grazer asserted that Jones' opposing memorandum did not dispute the fact that Jones and 
his son actively <l iv ^  lied tywuu tw\\ .i u\ t miilon I ones Construction into GS Jones Construction, 
Inc. Further, Grazer asserted that payments to third-party subcontractors who worked on IL 
Savanna project MV niHLV<ml lo whether the transfer of funds was fraudulent. Accordingly, 
Grazer contends that there are no material issues of fact regarding \\\K motion :PHI requests l IK; 
Court grant him summary judgment in the sum of $80,000, plus interest. 
Subsequently, at the May 5, 2009 hearii i y, (fie fuilir, .iijb.iiiilii'iJ Ihis iiiiiiln for decision. 
11
 On April 24, 2009, Grazer filed a motion to strike the affidavit of G. Scott Jones. In his accompanying supporting 
memorandum, Grazer argued that the affidavit contains inadmissible hearsay and that the documentation attached to 
the affidavit is insufficient to support the assertion that GS Jones Construction, Inc. took over the Sayama project. 
Grazer requested the Court disregard the affidavit in its entirety. On May 4, 2009, Jones filed a memorandum in 
opposition to Grazer's motion to strike. In his opposing memorandum, Jones argued that the assertions within his 
affidavit are based upon personal knowledge and thus, not hearsay. Upon the Court's review of the affidavit, it 
appears that the assertions within are based upon G. Scott Jones' personal knowledge and are not hearsay 
statements; however, the attached supporting documentation does not sufficiently demonstrate that GS Jones 
Construction, Inc. took the Sayama project over or that Grazer was already paid $ 18,000.00 from the project's 
proceeds. Accordingly, while the Court must DENY Grazer's motion to strike, the Court finds that the affidavit 
leaves several matters unclear. Specifically, the Court finds that material issues of fact exist regarding the sums 
Gordon Jones Construction was due from the Sayama project's proceeds, what portion of those sums is subject to 
Grazer's garnishment, and whether Grazer received $18,000.00 from the project's proceeds. 
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Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate only 
where 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure for garnishments. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 64D. With regard to what property may be garnished, the Rule provides: 
"The maximum portion of disposable earning of an individual subject to 
seizure is the lesser of: 
(a)(1) 50% of the defendant's disposable earnings for a writ to enforce 
payment of a judgment for failure to support defendant children or 25% of 
the defendant's disposable earnings for any other judgment; or 
(a)(2) the amount by which the defendant's disposable earning for a pay 
period exceeds the number of weeks in that pay period multiplied by thirty 
times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in effect at the time the earnings are payable." 
Id. at 64D(a) (Emphasis added). The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure defines "earnings" as: 
"[Compensation, however denominated, paid or payable to an individual 
for personal services, including periodic payment pursuant to a pension or 
retirement program. Earning accrue on the last day of the period in which 
they were earned." 
Id. at 64(a)(5). Further the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure define "disposable earnings" as: 
"[T]hat part of earning for a pay period remaining after the deduction of all amounts required by 
law to be withheld." Id. at 64(a)(4). Accordingly, and contrary to Grazer's airgument, a valid writ 
of garnishment does not enable a party to obtain 100% of the earnings of an individual that is 
subject to the garnishment. See Id. at 64D(a). 
Here, it is uncertain what portion of the $80,000 Sayama payment that Gordon Jones 
Construction is entitled, as Jones' affidavit indicates that GS Jones Construction, Inc. took over 
at least a portion of the Sayama project and performed a considerable amount of work. At this 
time, it is unknown how much work Gordon Jones Construction performed at the Sayamas' 
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residence. Further, Jones' affidavit states that $50,420.38 of the $80,000 was used ic p\v} 
subcontractor lor (heir work on the Sayamas' renovation. Additionally, $6,964.89 of the 
$80,000 was used to pay providers of materials l'nr tin* S<n anus" innovation, i 'ontrary to 
Grazer's argument, the payment of the material providers and subcontractors does affect the 
amount that CM,)/n aumlil uam h\ i nlm i ii' his garnishment under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure's definition of "disposable earnings." See Utah R. Civ. P. 64(a"H 4), f»4l)(a). 
\ 11 'irttingi y, h- i t in i finds that because it is uncertain how much of the $80,000 paid by the 
Sayamas is subject to Grazer's garnishment, a material issue of did exists and summary 
judgment on Grazer's motion may not be granted. 
Further, while Grazer alleges lli.il tin1 lianstci f >f (li« 'hKU.IKMl was a fraudulent transfer 
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, Utah Code Ann. §25-6-1 et seq., Grazer's 
pleadings and fill* '(-aliot K do m ii t>tablr4i <i prima facie case of fraudulent transfer. Pursuant to 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act: 
"A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor ... if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation; and the debtor: (i) was engaged or was about to 
engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the 
debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; 
or (ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed 
that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due." 
Utah Code Ann. §26-6-5(1). To determine "actual intent" under the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfers Act, the Court m,n \«n >nli"i 111« U)\U)\\ ing factors: 
(a) the transfer was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control oft / * - - • msferred after the transfer; 
(c) whether the transfer was disclosed oi >"or ^ l 
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(d) before the transfer was made, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the valued of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to 
the value of the asset transferred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or after a substantial debt was incurred; AND 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred 
the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
See Id. at 25-6-5(2). Thus, the Court's finding of an occurrence of a fraudulent transfer is highly 
fact sensitive. See Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 163 P.3d 713, 722 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) 
("Importantly the existence of fraudulent intent is a factual question, which necessarily involves 
weighing the evidence presented and assessing the credibility of witnesses - tasks largely within 
the province of the fact-finder."). 
Here, Grazer has argued that some of factors listed in Utah Code Ann. §25-6-5(2) are 
present in the transfer of the $80,000 payment from the Sayamas. Specifically, Grazer has 
asserted that the transfer was to an insider, i.e. Jones' son and Jones' newly formed company, 
that Jones has retained possession and control of the transferred funds, and that the transfer was 
in anticipation of a judgment being entered in this litigation. However, the Court finds that these 
assertions alone, without discussion of the other factors listed within the statute and the 
opportunity to weigh and assess the credibility of witnesses and competent evidence presented, 
the Court cannot find that Jones transferred the Sayamas' payment with "actual intent" to hinder, 
delay, or defraud Grazer of his judgment. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that summary judgment on Grazer's motion for partial 
summary judgment against GS Jones Construction, Inc. is inappropriate at this time. The Court 
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must therefore DENY Grazer's motion for partial summai \ tinliiii'inif <if.Minsl l iS lour, 
Construction, Inc. 
V. Counterclaim Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Garnishee Judgment Against the 
Shaffer Law Office or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment Setting Aside 
Fraudulent Transfers. 
i iii ii'i'hfiufy * '\ .^ inw, < na/ri filed Ins motion tor entry of garnishee judgment against 
the Shaffer Law Office or for summary judgment setting aside fraudulent transfers In (tie 
accompanying supporting memorandum, Grazer argued that the Shaffer Law Office responded 
inaccurately to his writ of garnishment, served October 5, 2005, by failing la nlaihly I lit1 retainer 
paid to it by Jones. Grazer asserted that the retainer is subject to garnishment and that Grazer is 
entitled to garnishee judgnitiil a^uU the Sh.illVi 1 av Dllin i: foi llui total amount it holds in its 
trust account for Jones, $58,452.17 plus interest 
The SkitTii 1 aw Office filed ii:> memorandum in opposition to Grazer's motion on 
February 24,2009. In its opposing memorandum, the Shaffer Law Office objected lo (ira/ei s 
charaetenzal ion < il In Hies" actions as fraudulent transfers, as the Court has not heard nor ruled 
upon the same. Next, the Shaffer Law Office argued that no tuia) judgment e\med mi < itioln i k>, 
2005, when Grazer served the writ of garnishment, and therefore, the writ was untimely. The 
Shaffer Law Office asserted that th< udgment j n ^ s m af t e r u n ^ i jts 
written ruling of April 13, 2006. Regardless, the Shaffer Law Office submitted that its response 
to the writ of garnishment 'was arniMii1 -e- low "• hiu\ ?i< I interest in the retainer paid to the law 
firm for its services. The Shaffer Law Office then argued that Grazer's motion is until nHy nil l"i 
R uk1 MIJ(h)( I) u' II'i1 Utah Rules of Civ il Procedure, which requires a reply to a response to a 
writ of garnishment and request for hearing to occur within Irn I i I)) Jays of the response's 
service. The Shaffer Law Office noted that Grazer's motion was filed nearly two (2) years after 
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its response was served. Finally, the Shaffer Law Office argued that the settlement agreement 
regarding Jones' bankruptcy action discharged Grazer's judgment and, as a result, further 
proceedings in this matter to collect the judgment are prohibited.12 
On March 10, 2009, Grazer filed his reply memorandum in support of his motion. In his 
reply, Grazer argued that the issue of when the judgment against Jones became final was 
disposed of in the Court's ruling of April 13, 2006. Grazer asserted that a valid judgment and 
valid garnishment existed at the time he served the writ of garnishment on the Shaffer Law 
Office. Next, Grazer asserted that the Shaffer Law Office's objections to the writ of garnishment 
are untimely, and that the Shaffer Law Office should have requested a hearing if it sought to 
challenge the writ and assert an interest in the property it held for Jones. Gnizer posited that Rule 
64D(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for an entry of a garnishee judgment when a 
garnishee responds inaccurately to a writ of garnishment. Grazer submitted that the Shaffer Law 
Office should not be allowed to benefit from its inaccurate responses. Finally, Grazer argued that 
the settlement agreement of Jones' bankruptcy action specifically excluded Jones' property that 
was fraudulently transferred. Grazer then requested the Court enter a garnishee judgment against 
the Shaffer Law Office for the total amount held within its trust account for Jones, plus interest. 
Subsequently, at the May 5,2009 hearing, the parties submitted this matter for decision. 
12
 The Shaffer Law Office filed a notice to submit for decision regarding Grazer's motion on March 6, 2009. On 
March 10, 2009, Grazer filed a motion for leave to file an untimely reply memorandum in support of his motion. In 
his accompanying supporting memorandum, Grazer argued that his reply memorandum was untimely due to the 
misleading nature of the title of the Shaffer Law Office's opposing memorandum. The Shaffer Law Office's 
memorandum in opposition to Grazer's motion for entry of garnishee judgment or for summary judgment to set 
aside fraudulent transfers was titled "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions." The Shaffer Law Office did not oppose Grazer's motion for leave 
to file an untimely reply memorandum. Upon review of Grazer's motion, the Court finds that the title of the Shaffer 
Law Office's opposing memorandum is misleading, as it refers to one of the other pending motions before the Court 
that Grazer had already responded to. Further, the Court finds that the parties will not be prejudiced by the Court 
allowing Grazer to file a reply memorandum. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Grazer's motion for leave to file an 
untimely reply. 
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As a primary consideration, the issue of when the judgment agamsl Jones tia/amc final 
c; was addressed and resolved in the Court's ruling of April 13, 2006. Within that ruling, the Court 
v* 
j | explicitly stated several times that Gram's iiidymenl became linal on Api il 13, 2006 Thus, no 
8 
•; final judgment existed at the time Grazer served the Shaffer Law Office with the writ of 
Hiunishmenl u\\ \ k lulu i ' 
J; Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contanplak's thai ,i J\M nishmenl may 
^ occur either after a judgment is entered or prior to the entry of a judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
64D(a) ("A writ of garnishment is a\ aiUble niter final iinlf'ineii! or alter the claim has been filed 
and prior to judgment."). However, Rule 64D requires compliance with several factors for a pre-
una' I'MigiiK in '' "I »*" >H -flo >'IM; S<r id at u4l>(h) \pre-fmal judgment writ of garnishment 
requires all of the following: 
ill iliai I he defendant is indebted to the plaintiff; 
(2) that the action is upon a contract; 
(3) that payment of the claim has not been secured by a lien upon property in the State of 
I Jtah; 
(4) that the garnishee possess or controls property of the defendant; AND 
(5) that the plaintiff has attached the garnishee fee established by Utah Code Ann. § /K 
44, i.e. $10 or $25 depending on whether the garnishment is single or continuing. 
See Id at64D(b). 
Here, the parties do not dispute whether Grazer complied with the foregoing factors when 
he served the writ of garnishment on the Shaffi : ; also undisputed that 
Grazer knew of the retainer that Jones had paid to the Shaffer Law Office for its legal 
representation iii i hi s artion .md •< l.tfuf iwMU rs prior to serving the writ. Grazer was informed of 
the retainer when he took Jones' deposition on September 14, 2005. 
23 
Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff or defendant to file a 
reply to a garnishee's response and request a hearing if it challenges the accuracy of the 
garnishee's answers, to wit: 
"The plaintiff or defendant may file and serve upon the garnishee a reply 
to the answers and request a hearing.... The reply may ... challenge the 
accuracy of the answers[.]" 
Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(h)(l)(B). Further, under the plain language of Rule 64D(h)(l), "[t]he reply 
shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of the answers or amended answers." Id. at 
64D(h)(l). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required Grazer 
to have filed a challenge to the Shaffer Law Office's responses within ten (10) days after their 
service. 
Here, Grazer's motion is clearly untimely under Rule 64D(h)(l), as Grazer filed the 
instant motion over two (2) years after the Shaffer Law Office served its responses. However, 
Grazer argues that the Shaffer Law Office had a duty to respond accurately to the writ of 
garnishment and should have requested a hearing if it asserted an interest in the retainer paid by 
Jones. This argument is supported by the Utah Court of Appeals case of Rappleye v. Rappleye. 
99 P.3d 348 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). In Rappleye, the Court stated: 
"In a garnishment proceeding, the garnishee is typically a neutral party to 
the garnishment proceedings... . However, sometimes a garnishee departs 
from a neutral position to assert its own claim to the property... . If a 
garnishee does assert ownership claims to the property, Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 64D establishes a process for resolving competing claims to the 
property made by the judgment creditor, judgment debtor, and garnishee." 
Id. at 357-58 (Internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Court's analysis in 
Rappleye interpreted an older version of Rule 64D, Rule 69(h)(1), which provided that any party 
could request a hearing regarding a claim or interest in judgment debtor's property subject to a 
garnishment, to wit: 
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"Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69(h)(1), not only the judgment 
debtor, biit 'any other person who owns or claims an interest in the 
property subject to execution may request a hearing to claim any 
exemption to the execution, or to challenge the issuance of the writ.'" 
Id. at 358, fh. 8 (quotingUtah R. Civ. P. 69(h)(1) (1994)) \lw .'nm/nf v(TSinii n\ k\llh: t»4i> does 
not contain this language and specifically requires either the plaintiff or the defendant to file a 
reply to challenge the accuracy of the jjarnislire's responses See Utah K. (. IV. P. 64D(h)(l). 
Indeed, it makes little sense to require the garnishee to file a reply and request for hearing in 
response to his i linnwiiiin \HI in .i iviil ol garnishment 
Accordingly, the Court rejects Grazer's contention that the Shaffer I .aw Office was 
rrqwred f > i iqm »  J hearing regarding the retainer it held, rather than himself, particularly in 
light of the fact that Grazer was clearly and undispuloillv ay-, ai c >( I hi. 1* laniii I Ins is further 
supported by the Utah Supreme Court discussion of garnishment proceedings in Upper Blue 
Bench Irrigation DisL v. i 'nnhi^unl \iii 7 llmkA />IP,J ( o , f' i1 M 1048 il'tah 1937), In 
Upper Blue Bench Irrigation DisL, the Utah Supreme Court stated in dicta: 
"It appears equally as obvious that had the bank answered the writ that 
was served that is was in nowise indebted to the district no valid garnishee 
judgment could have been rendered against it, in the absence of further 
proceedings successfully traversing such answer." 
Id. at 1053. Further, in discussing a garnishment proceeding the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
"The garnishee is merely a stakeholder, having no liability to the garnishor 
until a valid judgment is entered against him. The right and power of the 
Court to enter a garnishee judgment, therefore, is predicated upon prior 
valid proceedings disclosing that the conditions are such that this remedy 
has been so proceeded with that the Court's jurisdiction to consummate 
such proceedings with a judgment against the garnishee is invoked." 
he Court therefore finds that Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required < *•  * or 
to file a reply and irqii«\sl for hesn inf.\ uiihin ten (10) days the Shaffer Law Office's responses, 
rather than requiring the Shaffer Law Office to request the hearing upon the filing of its 
responses to Grazer's writ of garnishment. Accordingly, the Court must DENY Grazer's motion 
for garnishee judgment against the Shaffer Law Office as it is untimely.13 
Furthermore, even when viewing Grazer's motion as the alternative motion for summary 
judgment setting aside fraudulent transfers, the Court must still DENY Grazer's motion. As 
stated herein above, to succeed in a cause of action for fraudulent transfer under the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfers Act, the Court must employ a highly fact sensitive analysis of several 
factors to determine whether Jones provided the retainer to the Shaffer Law Office with the 
"actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor[.]" Utah Code Ann. §25-6-
5(l)(a). 
Here, Grazer's pleadings are devoid of argument pertaining to the factors for finding 
"actual intent" as set forth in of Utah Code Ann. §25-6-5(2). Further, since the Court's analysis 
of a fraudulent transfer claim is highly fact sensitive, the Court finds that material issues of fact 
exist as to whether Jones' had an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Grrazer when he 
provided the disputed retainer to the Shaffer Law Office. The Court notes, however, that from 
the record before it and the evidence presented herein, Grazer will be hard pressed to make such 
a showing with regard to the retainer paid to the Shaffer Law Office. Accordingly, Court must 
DENY Grazer's motion for summary judgment setting aside fraudulent transfers. 
13
 Rule 64D also provides that "the court may deem the reply timely if filed before notice of sale of the property or 
before the property is delivered to the plaintiff." Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(h)(l). This provision of the Rule would allow 
the Court to consider Grazer's motion although it is untimely, as the Shaffer Law Office's trust account still contains 
funds from the retainer paid to it by Jones. However, because Jones' bankruptcy action discharged Grazer's 
judgment against Jones, the Court cannot consider Grazer's untimely motion to reopen his judgment against Jones 
through the garnishment of the Shaffer Law Office retainer. Accordingly, the only argument that would allow 
Grazer to succeed on his motion is that the retainer was a fraudulent transfer of Jones' property. 
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CONCLUSION 
if \t 
n 
Si 
i; 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court: (1) DENIES Allen Grazer's Motion for Equitable 
Lien and OaVr of FV>reolosuiv (Malm 1 I;H im), (jf I)|«N1!"S Defendant Grazer's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemption'. ( \)<W \N1> I he 
Olsen I rust s Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (4) DENIES Grazer's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment Against (iS lours f "oust DENIES Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Garnishee Judgment Against the Shaffer Law Office or, in the 
Alternative, , for, tummarv IIKIJIIIIUII Selling Aside Fraudulent Transfers. 
The Court directs the Olsen Trust and Grazer to transfer the funds and execute the 
'louimenis necw.ii v to effectuate the July 8, 2008 attempted redemption consistent with this 
Ruling. The Court further directs Jones to prepare ami subiml an onler that u» i'on,sislijnl with .and 
reflects this Ruling. 
Date signed: ff y-Ig 'Q f . 
DISTRICT COlfiRT JU0OE 
MICHAEL G.ALLPHI 
j&gsm, 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
Prepared by 
Joseph M.R. Covey (7492) 
Jonathan R. Schofield (8274) 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 S State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 RECEIVED AUG 1 2 2009 
Phone: 801-532-7840 
Fax:801-532-7750 
Attorneys for Gordon Jones and his Redemption Right Assignee, Ludvig D. Olsen and Jackie M. 
Olsen, as trustees of the Ludvig D. Olsen and Jackie M Olsen Trust 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH 
GORDON A. JONES, AN INDIVIDUAL, and 
RICHARD H. BARNEY, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants, 
v. 
ALLEN F. GRAZER, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff. 
[PROPOSED] ORDER ON CROSS 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON REDEMPTION 
Civil No. 020700570 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
Defendant Allen F. Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Invalidity 
of Attempted Redemption and the Olsen Trust's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
came before the Court for hearing on May 5,2009. Lincoln W. Hobbs appeared on behalf of 
Allen F. Grazer ("Defendant"). Joseph M.R. Covey appeared on behalf of Ludvig D. Olsen and 
Jackie M. Olsen, as trustees of the Ludvig D. Olsen and Jackie M. Olsen Trust and as the 
assignee of Gordon Jones' redemption rights ("Olsen Trust"). At the conclusion of the hearing, 
niffim For Sm™<y Ju«g"*m I Mil Hill minim... OnRec 
the Court took the matter under advisement and on June 16, 2009 issued a Ruling on Motions 
Pending at May 5, 2009 Hearing (the "Ruling"). 
For the reasons stated in the Court's Ruling, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Invalidity of 
Attempted Redemption is DENIED. 
2. The Olsen Trust's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
3. On July 8,2008, the Olsen Trust substantially complied with the redemption 
procedures of Rule 69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it provided 
Defendant's counsel, who was acting on behalf of his client, with (a) a copy of the 
Assignment; (b) a check made payable to Plaintiffs counsel in the amount of 
$210; and (c) a certificate of redemption. 
4. Following receipt of the $210, Defendant shall promptly execute and deliver to 
the Olsen Trust a certificate of redemption in accordance with Rule 69C(g) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, containing, among other things, a detailed 
description of the real property and a statement that all right, title, and interest of 
the Defendant in the property is conveyed to the Olsen Trust. 
5. The Olsen Trust shall promptly pay Defendant the redemption price of $210.00 
by delivering to Defendant's counsel, Lincoln W. Hobbs, a check for $210.00 
made payable to Defendant. 
6. The Clerk of Court shall release to the Olsen Trust the $2,465.00 that was 
deposited into the Court on or about August 15, 2008. 
7. The Court has determined that there is no just reason for delaying the entry of this 
Order and hereby certifies this Order as a final judgment with respect to all of the 
claims involving the Olsens and the redemption, in accordance with Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IT IS SO ORDERED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of L&U<^, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
'Honorable Michael 
Second District Co 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HOBBS & OLSON 
Lin6>fa W. Hobbs 
SHAFFER LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on August / / , 2009, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
(PROPOSED) ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
REDEMPTION was served via United States first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Margaret H. Olson 
Julie Ladle 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
466 E 500 S, Ste 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David Shaffer 
Shaffer Law Office 
562 S Main St 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Nu-Trend Electric Company 
245 West 300 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Stephen F. Noel 
Smith Knowles PC 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Scott Sessions 
289 West Tobe Drive 
Centerville, UT 84014 
S. Austin Johnson 
Johnson Law Associates 
251 West River Park Drive, Suite 
100 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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